On the alleged connection between moral evil and human freedom: A response to Trakakis' third critique

Sophia 47 (2):223-230 (2008)
In this essay, I respond to Nick Trakakis’ “A Third (Meta-)Critique.” This critique is directed against my argument concerning the inadequacy of the traditional theistic argument from free will. I contend that the argument from free will does not adequately explain the distribution of moral evil in the world. I maintain that the third critique, like Trakakis’ earlier critiques, is unconvincing. I remain convinced that my original argument regarding the inadequacy of the traditional argument from free will is compelling. The argument from freedom of the will, considered in itself, is unpersuasive.
Keywords Free will  Moral evil
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DOI 10.1007/s11841-008-0054-7
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