Authors
Justin Tiehen
University of Puget Sound
Abstract
How should ‘the physical’ be defined for the purpose of formulating physicalism? In this paper I defend a version of the via negativa according to which a property is physical just in case it is neither fundamentally mental nor possibly realized by a fundamentally mental property. The guiding idea is that physicalism requires functionalism, and thus that being a type identity theorist requires being a realizer-functionalist. In §1 I motivate my approach partly by arguing against Jessica Wilson's no fundamental mentality constraint. In §2 I set out my preferred definition of ‘the physical’ and make my case that physicalism requires functionalism. In §3 I defend my proposal by attacking the leading alternative account of ‘the physical,’ the theory-based conception. Finally, in §4 I draw on my definition, together with Jaegwon Kim's account of intertheoretic reduction, to defend the controversial view that physicalism requires a priori physicalism.
Keywords physicalism  functionalism  via negativa  panpsychism  reduction  a priori entailment
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/phpr.12279
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

New Work for a Theory of Universals.David Lewis - 1983 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (4):343-377.
Epiphenomenal Qualia.Frank Jackson - 1982 - Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136.
The Structure of Science.Ernest Nagel - 1961 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 17 (2):275-275.
An Argument for the Identity Theory.David Lewis - 1966 - Journal of Philosophy 63 (1):17-25.
Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1981 - Philosophy 56 (217):431-433.

View all 91 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

A Causal Argument for Dualism.Bradford Saad - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (10):2475-2506.
Physicalism.Justin Tiehen - 2018 - Analysis 78 (3):537-551.
A Dilemma About the Mental.Guy Dove & Andreas Elpidorou - 2021 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Physicalism and the Via Negativa.Sara Worley - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 131 (1):101-26.
The Via Negativa: Not the Way to Physicalism.Robert Bishop - 2010 - Mind and Matter 8 (2):203-214.
Ectoplasm Earth.Justin Tiehen - 2012 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 42 (3-4):167-185.
Non-Reductive Physicalism?A. D. Smith - 1993 - In Howard M. Robinson (ed.), Objections to Physicalism. Oxford University Press.
On Characterizing the Physical.Jessica Wilson - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 131 (1):61-99.
Functionalism and Token Physicalism.Terence Horgan - 1984 - Synthese 59 (June):321-38.
From Realizer Functionalism to Nonreductive Physicalism.JeeLoo Liu - 2008 - Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 42:149-160.
Current Physics and 'the Physical'.Agustín Vicente - 2011 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 62 (2):393-416.
Physicalism and its Application to Psychology.Gawaine James Michael Batchelor - 1994 - Dissertation, University of Southern California
What is Token Physicalism?Noa Latham - 2003 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (3):270-290.
Functionalism and Type Physicalism.Michael Tye - 1983 - Philosophical Studies 44 (September):161-74.
Troubles with Functionalism.Ned Block - 1978 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 9:261-325.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2015-12-02

Total views
291 ( #30,089 of 2,433,562 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
17 ( #42,490 of 2,433,562 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes