Psychophysical Reductionism without Type Identities

American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (3):223-236 (2012)
Justin Tiehen
University of Puget Sound
Nonreductive physicalists have a causal exclusion problem. Given certain theses all physicalists accept, including psychophysical supervenience and the causal closure of the physical realm, it is difficult to see how irreducible mental phenomena could make a causal difference to the world. The upshot, according to those who push the problem, is that we must embrace reductive physicalism. Only then is mental causation saved. Grant the argument, at least provisionally. Here our focus is the conditional question: What form should one's reductionism take if it is motivated in part by the exclusion problem? Must one be a type identity theorist, or are alternative reductive views available, as Jaegwon Kim has suggested more than once?
Keywords Jaegwon Kim  Reductionism  Type Identity Theory  Eliminativism
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The Cost of Forfeiting Causal Inheritance.Justin T. Tiehen - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (2):491-507.

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