Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (4):661-672 (2019)

Authors
Hannah Tierney
University of California, Davis
Abstract
Traditionally, theories of moral responsibility feature only the minimally sufficient conditions for moral responsibility. While these theories are well-suited to account for the threshold of responsibility, it’s less clear how they can address questions about the degree to which agents are responsible. One feature that intuitively affects the degree to which agents are morally responsible is how difficult performing a given action is for them. Recently, philosophers have begun to develop accounts of scalar moral responsibility that make use of this notion of difficulty (Coates and Swenson 2013; Nelkin 2016). In this paper, I argue that these accounts, although innovative, are incomplete. The degree to which agents are morally responsible is determined not only by the difficulties that agents face but also by the quality of the reasons for which they act.
Keywords moral responsibility  Coates  Swenson  Nelkin  Quality of reasons
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DOI 10.1080/00048402.2018.1550795
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In Praise of Desire.Nomy Arpaly & Timothy Schroeder - 2013 - Oxford University Press.

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