Desires and Practical Reasons
The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 9:123-128 (2006)
| Abstract |
This paper refutes a common and influential thesis about the conditions under which desires provide agents with practical reasons. That thesis is that if any agent. A, has a desire which A could satisfy by (ping, then A has a reason—a minimal reason, at least—to (p. Although this thesis comes close to stating a truth, it falls short.
|
| Keywords | Conference Proceedings Contemporary Philosophy General Interest |
| Categories | (categorize this paper) |
| DOI | 10.5840/wcp212006918 |
| Options |
Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
|
Download options
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articlesDesires, Reasons, and Causes. [REVIEW]Stephen Darwall - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2):436–443.
Reasons From The Humean Perspective.Elizabeth S. Radcliffe - 2012 - Philosophical Quarterly 62 (249):777-796.
Desire-Based Theories of Reasons, Pleasure, and Welfare.Chris Heathwood - 2011 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 6:79-106.
Prudence and the Temporal Structure of Practical Reasons.Duncan MacIntosh - 2003 - In Sarah Stroud & Christine Tappolet (eds.), Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality. Oxford University Press. pp. 230--250.
Reason in Action.John Gibbons - 2009 - In Lucy O'Brien & Matthew Soteriou (eds.), Mental Actions. Oxford University Press. pp. 72.
Desires as Additional Reasons? The Case of Tie-Breaking.Attila Tanyi - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 152 (2):209-227.
Reason Internalism.Alan H. Goldman - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (3):505 - 533.
Reason and Desire: The Case of Affective Desires.Attila Tanyi - 2010 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 6 (2):67-89.
Added to PP index
2011-12-02
Total downloads
41 ( #141,704 of 2,226,009 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #428,364 of 2,226,009 )
2011-12-02
Total downloads
41 ( #141,704 of 2,226,009 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #428,364 of 2,226,009 )
How can I increase my downloads?
Monthly downloads
My notes
