Is "Why Be Moral?" A Pseudo-Question?: Hospers and Thornton on the Amoralist's Challenge

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (4):549-66 (2006)
Many arguments have been advanced for the view that "Why be moral?" is a pseudo-question. In this paper I address one of the most widely known and influential of them, one that comes from John Hospers and J. C. Thornton. I do so partly because, strangely, an important phase of that argument has escaped close attention. It warrants such attention because, firstly, not only is it important to the argument in which it appears, it is important in wider respects. For instance, if it is sound it has weighty consequences even if the argument in which it figures fails. Secondly, it is not sound; it succumbs to a simple objection.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2006.00277.x
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References found in this work BETA
Morals by Agreement.David Gauthier - 1986 - Oxford University Press.
Morals From Motives.Michael Slote - 2001 - Oxford University Press.
Practical Ethics.Peter Singer - 1979 - Cambridge University Press.
Republic. Plato & C. D. C. Reeve - 1974 - Princeton: Hackett Publishing.

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