Theoria 86 (3):293-308 (2020)

Authors
John J. Tilley
Indiana University Purdue University, Indianapolis
Abstract
Theoria, EarlyView.
Keywords Elizabeth Tropman  Gilbert Harman  moral beliefs  moral explanation  moral knowledge  moral realism  moral scepticism
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DOI 10.1111/theo.12236
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References found in this work BETA

Moral Realism.Peter Railton - 1986 - Philosophical Review 95 (2):163-207.
The Nature of Morality.D. Z. Phillips & Gilbert Harman - 1978 - Philosophical Quarterly 28 (110):89.
Explanatory Challenges in Metaethics.Joshua Schechter - 2018 - In Tristram McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. Routledge. pp. 443-459.

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