Reasons, rational requirements, and the putative pseudo-question “why be moral?”

Synthese 161 (2):309 - 323 (2008)
Abstract
In this paper, I challenge a familiar argument -- a composite of arguments in the literature -- for the view that “Why be moral?” is a pseudo-question. I do so by refuting a component of that argument, a component that is not only crucial to the argument but important in its own right. That component concerns the status of moral reasons in replies to “Why be moral?”; consequently, this paper concerns reasons and rationality no less than it concerns morality. The work I devote to those topics shows not only that the argument I address is unsound, but that the conclusion of that argument is false. “Why be moral?” is no pseudo-question.
Keywords Rationality  Practical reasons  Moral reasons  Reasons for action  Pseudo-questions  “Why be moral?”
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-007-9164-y
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References found in this work BETA
Morals by Agreement.David P. Gauthier - 1986 - Oxford University Press.
The Sources of Normativity.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1996 - Cambridge University Press.
Moral Realism: A Defence.Russ Shafer-Landau - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
Sources, Reasons, and Requirements.Bruno Guindon - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (5):1253-1268.

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