Two kinds of moral relativism

Journal of Value Inquiry 29 (2):187-192 (1995)
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Abstract

Discussions of moral relativism commonly distinguish between normative relativism (NR) and moral judgment relativism (MJR) without highlighting the differences between the two. One significant difference—a difference between normative relativism and the most prevalent type of moral judgment relativism—is not immediately obvious and has not been discussed in print. This paper explains it and draws out some of its philosophical consequences.

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John J. Tilley
Indiana University Purdue University, Indianapolis

Citations of this work

Metaethics.Geoff Sayre-McCord - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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References found in this work

Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics.David Owen Brink - 1989 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Moral relativism defended.Gilbert Harman - 1975 - Philosophical Review 84 (1):3-22.
What is moral relativism?Gilbert Harman - 1978 - In A. I. Goldman & I. Kim (eds.), Values and Morals. Boston: D. Reidel. pp. 143--161.
The concept of morals.W. T. Stace - 1937 - New York,: Macmillan.

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