The Problem for Normative Cultural Relativism

Ratio Juris 11 (3):272-290 (1998)
Abstract
The key problem for normative (or moral) cultural relativism arises as soon as we try to formulate it. It resists formulations that are (1) clear, precise, and intelligible; (2) plausible enough to warrant serious attention; and (3) faithful to the aims of leading cultural relativists, one such aim being to produce an important alternative to moral universalism. Meeting one or two of these conditions is easy; meeting all three is not. I discuss twenty-four candidates for the label "cultural relativism," showing that not one meets all three conditions. In the end I conclude that cultural relativists have produced nothing that threatens universalism.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/1467-9337.00091
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Added to PP index
2010-09-02

Total downloads
730 ( #2,135 of 2,231,943 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
166 ( #1,350 of 2,231,943 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature