The Problem of Inconsistency in Wollaston's Moral Theory

History of Philosophy Quarterly 29 (3):265–80 (2012)
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Abstract

This paper challenges Francis Hutcheson's and John Clarke of Hull's alleged demonstrations that William Wollaston's moral theory is inconsistent. It also present a form of the inconsistency objection that fares better than theirs, namely, that of Thomas Bott (1688-1754). Ultimately, the paper shows that Wollaston's moral standard is not what some have thought it to be; that consequently, his philosophy withstands the best-known efforts to expose it as inconsistent; and further, that one of the least-known British moralists is more important than hitherto thought, in that he uncovers the inconsistency Clarke and Hutcheson try in vain to elicit.

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2012-07-24

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Author's Profile

John J. Tilley
Indiana University Purdue University, Indianapolis

References found in this work

A treatise of human nature: a critical edition.David Hume - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by David Fate Norton & Mary J. Norton.
Wollaston's Early Critics.John J. Tilley - 2012 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 20 (6):1097-1116.

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