Doomsday Needn’t Be So Bad

Dialectica 72 (2):275-296 (2018)

Authors
Travis Timmerman
Seton Hall University
Abstract This article has no associated abstract. (fix it)
Keywords Death  Lament  Doomsday  Collective Aterlife  Afterlife  Scheffler  Infertility
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Reprint years 2018
DOI 10.1111/1746-8361.12227
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References found in this work BETA

Mortal Questions.Thomas Nagel - 1979 - Cambridge University Press.
Mortal Questions.[author unknown] - 1979 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 43 (3):578-578.
Well-Being and Death.Ben Bradley - 2009 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Dismantling the Asymmetry Argument.Vlastimil Vohánka - 2019 - Journal of Value Inquiry 53 (1):75-90.

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