If You Want to Die Later, Then Why Don't You Want to Have Been Born Earlier?

In Michael Cholbi & Travis Timmerman (eds.), Exploring the Philosophy of Death and Dying: Classic and Contemporary Perspectives. New York: (2021)
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Travis Timmerman
Seton Hall University

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