If You Want to Die Later, Then Why Don't You Want to Have Been Born Earlier?

In Michael Cholbi & Travis Timmerman (eds.), Exploring the Philosophy of Death and Dying: Classic and Contemporary Perspectives (forthcoming)

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Travis Timmerman
Seton Hall University
Abstract This article has no associated abstract. (fix it)
Keywords asymmetry problem  symmetry argument  death  dying  Kaufman  Nagel
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