Partial awareness distinguishes between measuring conscious perception and conscious content: Reply to Dienes and Seth

Consciousness and Cognition 19 (4):1081-1083 (2010)
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Abstract

In their comment on Sandberg, Timmermans, Overgaard, and Cleeremans , Dienes and Seth argue that increased sensitivity of the Perceptual Awareness Scale is a consequence of the scale being less exclusive rather than more exhaustive. According to Dienes and Seth, this is because PAS may measure some conscious content, though not necessarily relevant conscious content, “If one saw a square but was only aware of seeing a flash of something, then one has not consciously seen a square.” In this reply, we claim that there is a difference between conscious visual experience, which may be partial, and the resulting conscious content, which is conceptual. Whereas PAS measures the first, confidence judgments and post-decision wagering measure the second

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Author Profiles

Morten Overgaard
Aalborg University
Kristian Sandberg
University of Aarhus