An Embarrassment for Double-Halfers

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):146-151 (2012)
Abstract
“Double-halfers” think that throughout the Sleeping Beauty Problem, Beauty should keep her credence that a fair coin flip came up heads equal to 1/2. I introduce a new wrinkle to the problem that shows even double-halfers can't keep Beauty's credences equal to the objective chances for all coin-flip propositions. This leaves no way to deny that self-locating information generates an unexpected kind of inadmissible evidence
Keywords self‐location  credence  Sleeping Beauty Problem  chance  Principal Principle
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1002/tht3.21
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 27,195
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Sleeping Beauty: Reply to Elga.David Lewis - 2001 - Analysis 61 (3):171–76.
The Relevance of Self-Locating Beliefs.Michael G. Titelbaum - 2008 - Philosophical Review 117 (4):555-606.

View all 10 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Everettian Confirmation and Sleeping Beauty: Reply to Wilson.Darren Bradley - 2015 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66 (3):683-693.
A Devastating Example for the Halfer Rule.Vincent Conitzer - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (8):1985-1992.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2012-10-09

Total downloads

69 ( #75,542 of 2,163,866 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

3 ( #129,223 of 2,163,866 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums