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Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (5):670-691 (2015)
Authors
Michael Titelbaum
University of Wisconsin, Madison
Abstract
What goes wrong, from a rational point of view, when an agent’s beliefs change while her evidence remains constant? I canvass a number of answers to this question suggested by recent literature, then identify some desiderata I would like any potential answer to meet. Finally, I suggest that the rational problem results from the undermining of reasoning processes that are necessarily extended in time
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DOI 10.1080/00455091.2015.1124000
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References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.
Epistemic Permissiveness.Roger White - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):445–459.
Time-Slice Rationality.Brian Hedden - 2015 - Mind 124 (494):449-491.

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