In Defense of Right Reason

Abstract

Starting from the premise that akrasia is irrational, I argue that it is always a rational mistake to have false beliefs about the requirements of rationality. Using that conclusion, I defend logical omniscience requirements, the claim that one can never have all-things-considered misleading evidence about what's rational, and the Right Reasons position concerning peer disagreement.

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Michael Titelbaum
University of Wisconsin, Madison

Citations of this work

A Modesty Proposal.Jennifer Rose Carr - 2019 - Synthese 198 (4):3581-3601.

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