Plausible Permissivism

Authors
Michael Titelbaum
University of Wisconsin, Madison
Matthew Kopec
Australian National University
Abstract
Abstract. Richard Feldman’s Uniqueness Thesis holds that “a body of evidence justifies at most one proposition out of a competing set of proposi- tions”. The opposing position, permissivism, allows distinct rational agents to adopt differing attitudes towards a proposition given the same body of evidence. We assess various motivations that have been offered for Uniqueness, including: concerns about achieving consensus, a strong form of evidentialism, worries about epistemically arbitrary influences on belief, a focus on truth-conduciveness, and consequences for peer disagreement. We argue that each of these motivations either misunderstands the commitments of permissivism or is question-begging. Better understanding permissivism makes it a much more plausible position.
Keywords Uniqueness Thesis  Permissivism  Rational Uniqueness  Rationality  Bayesianism  Epistemic Instrumentalism  Evidentialism  Richard Feldman  Roger White
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References found in this work BETA

Truth and Objectivity.Crispin Wright - 1992 - Harvard University Press.
The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1954 - Wiley Publications in Statistics.
Warrant for Nothing (and Foundations for Free)?Crispin Wright - 2004 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 78 (1):167–212.
Logical Foundations of Probability.Rudolf Carnap - 1950 - Chicago]University of Chicago Press.

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The Uniqueness Thesis.Matthew Kopec & Michael Titelbaum - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (4):189-200.

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