In Alan Hajek Christopher Hitchcock (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Probability and Philosophy. Oxford University Press (2016)

Michael Titelbaum
University of Wisconsin, Madison
A plea: If you're going to propose a Bayesian framework for updating self-locating degrees of belief, please read this piece first. I've tried to survey all the extant formalisms, group them by their general approach, then describe challenges faced by every formalism employing a given approach. Hopefully this survey will prevent further instances of authors' re-inventing updating rules already proposed elsewhere in the literature.
Keywords self-location  credences  Bayesianism
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Precise Credences.Michael Titelbaum - 2019 - In Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg (eds.), The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology. PhilPaper Foundation. pp. 1-55.
Bayesian Beauty.Silvia Milano - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-20.

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