The relevance of self-locating beliefs

Philosophical Review 117 (4):555-606 (2008)
Authors
Michael Titelbaum
University of Wisconsin, Madison
Abstract
Can self-locating beliefs be relevant to non-self-locating claims? Traditional Bayesian modeling techniques have trouble answering this question because their updating rule fails when applied to situations involving contextsensitivity. This essay develops a fully general framework for modeling stories involving context-sensitive claims. The key innovations are a revised conditionalization rule and a principle relating models of the same story with different modeling languages. The essay then applies the modeling framework to the Sleeping Beauty Problem, showing that when Beauty awakens her degree of belief in heads should be one-third. This demonstrates that it can be rational for an agent who gains only self-locating beliefs between two times to alter her degree of belief in a non-self-locating claim
Keywords self-location  Conditionalization  Bayesianism  Sleeping Beauty Problem  context-sensitivity
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s)
DOI 10.1215/00318108-2008-016
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 33,094
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Updating as Communication.Sarah Moss - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):225-248.
Confirmation in a Branching World: The Everett Interpretation and Sleeping Beauty.Darren Bradley - 2011 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 62 (2):323-342.

View all 35 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total downloads
124 ( #46,208 of 2,241,694 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
6 ( #69,536 of 2,241,694 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature