Philosophy and Public Affairs 36 (3):289-322 (2008)
AbstractA response to G.A. Cohen's argument that a prevailing "ethos" of justice would prevent a Rawlsian just society from having any income inequalities. I suggest that Cohen's argument fails because a Rawlsian ethos would involve correlates of both of Rawls' principles of justice.
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The Inegalitarian Ethos: Incentives, Respect, and Self-Respect.Emily McTernan - 2013 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 12 (1):93-111.
The Problem of Stability and the Ethos-Based Solution.Cristian Pérez Muñoz - 2016 - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 19 (2):163-183.
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