Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (4):397-406 (2011)

Authors
Torbjörn Tännsjö
Stockholm University
Abstract
Given a reasonable coherentist view of justification in ethics, applied ethics, as here conceived of, cannot only guide us, in our practical decisions, but also provide moral understanding through explanation of our moral obligations. Furthermore, applied ethics can contribute to the growth of knowledge in ethics as such. We put moral hypotheses to crucial test in individual cases. This claim is defended against the challenges from moral intuitionism and particularism
Keywords Considered intuitions  Cognitive psychotherapy  Intuitionism  Particularism  Theory in ethics
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DOI 10.1007/s10677-011-9293-8
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References found in this work BETA

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
Moral Reasons.Jonathan Dancy - 1993 - Blackwell.
The Right and the Good.W. D. Ross - 1930 - Philosophy 6 (22):236-240.

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Citations of this work BETA

Ethics, Logical Consistency and Practical Deliberation.Nancy Matchett - 2011 - Theoretical and Applied Ethics 1 (3).
Moral Theory and Theorizing in Health Care Ethics.Hugh Upton - 2011 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (4):431-443.

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