Southern Journal of Philosophy 26 (2):247-261 (1988)
Moral realism does not imply any interesting moral statements. However, There are pragmatic consequences of our acceptance of moral realism. If we accept moral realism we have good reasons to be concerned about moral arguments, And we are able to account for moral fallibility. If, On the other hand, We accept moral irrealism, A concern for moral arguments and moral consistency seems completely arbitrary, And we have difficulties to account for moral fallibility. We may even come to think, When accepting moral irrealism, That our lives lose much of their meaning
|Keywords||Analytic Philosophy Contemporary Philosophy General Interest|
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