Why did Weyl think that formalism's victory against intuitionism entails a defeat of pure phenomenology?

History and Philosophy of Logic 35 (2):198-208 (2014)
It has been contended that it is unjustified to believe, as Weyl did, that formalism's victory against intuitionism entails a defeat of the phenomenological approach to mathematics. The reason for this contention, recently put forth by Paolo Mancosu and Thomas Ryckman, is that, unlike intuitionistic Anschauung, phenomenological intuition could ground classical mathematics. I argue that this indicates a misinterpretation of Weyl's view, for he did not take formalism to prevail over intuitionism with respect to grounding classical mathematics. I also point out that the contention is false: if intuitionism fails, in the way Weyl thought it did, i.e., with respect to supporting scientific objectivity, then one should also reject the phenomenological approach, in the same respect.
Keywords formalism  intuitionism  phenomenology  objectivity  Weyl
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DOI 10.1080/01445340.2013.860732
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References found in this work BETA

Brouwerian Intuitionism.Michael Detlefsen - 1990 - Mind 99 (396):501-534.

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Citations of this work BETA

Introduction to the Special Issue Hermann Weyl and the Philosophy of the ‘New Physics’.Silvia De Bianchi & Gabriel Catren - 2018 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 61:1-5.

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