A problem for guidance control

Philosophical Quarterly 58 (233):685-692 (2008)
Abstract
Central to Fischer and Ravizza's theory of moral responsibility is the concept of guidance control, which involves two conditions: (1) moderate reasons-responsiveness, and (2) mechanism ownership. We raise a worry for Fischer and Ravizza's account of (1). If an agent acts contrary to reasons which he could not recognize, this should lead us to conclude that he is not morally responsible for his behaviour; but according to Fischer and Ravizza's account, he satisfies the conditions for guidance control and is therefore morally responsible. We consider ways in which the account of guidance control might be mended.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2008.576.x
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References found in this work BETA
Reasons and Responsibility.Gary Watson - 2001 - Ethics 111 (2):374-394.
The Free Will Revolution (Continued).John Martin Fischer - 2005 - Journal of Ethics 10 (3):315-345.
Responsibility and Control.Michael McKenna - 2001 - Journal of Philosophy 98 (2):93-100.

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Receptivity, Reactivity and the Successful Psychopath.Erick Ramirez - 2015 - Philosophical Explorations 18 (3):330-343.

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