Mind 125 (499):775-798 (2016)

Authors
Patrick Todd
University of Edinburgh
Abstract
There is a familiar debate between Russell and Strawson concerning bivalence and ‘the present King of France’. According to the Strawsonian view, ‘The present King of France is bald’ is neither true nor false, whereas, on the Russellian view, that proposition is simply false. In this paper, I develop what I take to be a crucial connection between this debate and a different domain where bivalence has been at stake: future contingents. On the familiar ‘Aristotelian’ view, future contingent propositions are neither true nor false. However, I argue that, just as there is a Russellian alternative to the Strawsonian view concerning ‘the present King of France’, according to which the relevant class of propositions all turn out false, so there is a Russellian alternative to the Aristotelian view, according to which future contingents all turn out false, not neither true nor false. The result: contrary to millennia of philosophical tradition, we can be open futurists without denying bivalence.
Keywords future contingents  bivalence  fatalism  thin red line  law of excluded middle  presupposition failure
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1093/mind/fzv170
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

On Denoting.Bertrand Russell - 1905 - Mind 14 (56):479-493.
On Referring.P. F. Strawson - 1950 - Mind 59 (235):320-344.
Future Contingents and Relative Truth.John MacFarlane - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (212):321–336.
An Essay on Free Will.Peter van Inwagen - 1983 - Oxford University Press.
An Essay on Free Will.Michael Slote - 1985 - Journal of Philosophy 82 (6):327-330.

View all 40 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Are There Indeterminate States of Affairs? Yes.Jessica M. Wilson - 2017 - In Elizabeth Barnes (ed.), Current Controversies in Metaphysics. Taylor & Francis. pp. 105-125.

View all 13 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Knowing Future Contingents.Ezio Di Nucci - 2012 - Logos and Episteme 3 (1):43-50.
In Defence of Ockhamism.Sven Rosenkranz - 2012 - Philosophia 40 (3):617-631.
Open Future and Modal Anti-Realism.Daniel Kodaj - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 168 (2):1-22.
Ockhamism Without Thin Red Lines.Andrea Iacona - 2014 - Synthese 191 (12):2633-2652.
Future Contingents, Indeterminacy and Context.Paula Sweeney - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (2):408-422.
A Future for the Thin Red Line.Alex Malpass & Jacek Wawer - 2012 - Synthese 188 (1):117-142.
The Truth About the Future.Jacek Wawer - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S3):365-401.
Timeless Truth.Andrea Iacona - 2013 - In Fabrice Correia & Andrea Iacona (eds.), Around the Tree. Springer.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2014-10-08

Total views
1,149 ( #3,596 of 2,421,247 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
119 ( #4,987 of 2,421,247 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes