Philosophy of Science 38 (4):530-541 (1971)

It is suggested that there is a strong connection between intentions and plans, and these plans are then taken to be programs of the sort suggested by Miller, Galanter, and Pribram in Plans and the Structure of Behavior. There is then a hierarchy of programs connected with intentions stretching from the macroscopic level of ordinary discourse to the neurological level. It is argued that as we proceed downwards we arrive at a threshold below which we can still describe the phenomena but below which we can no longer speak of intentions. The paper concludes with a discussion of the criteria for the identity of intentions at various levels
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DOI 10.1086/288394
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