Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (1):117 – 128 (2006)

Authors
Neal Tognazzini
Western Washington University
Abstract
What are the necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for an object's being a simple (an object without proper parts)? According to one prominent view, The Pointy View of Simples, an object is a simple if and only if the region occupied by that object contains exactly one point in space. According to another prominent view, MaxCon, an object is a simple if and only if it is maximally continuous. In this paper, I argue that both of these views are inconsistent with the possibility of discrete space. I then go on to formulate analogues to these two views that are consistent with this possibility, and argue that if we are willing to grant the possibility of discrete space, we should endorse the analogue to The Pointy View of Simples over the analogue to MaxCon.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1080/00048400600571786
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 71,259
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Parts of Classes.David K. Lewis - 1991 - Mind 100 (3):394-397.
Simples.Ned Markosian - 1998 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (2):213 – 228.
Parts of Classes.Michael Potter - 1993 - Philosophical Quarterly 43 (172):362-366.
Simples, Stuff, and Simple People.Ned Markosian - 2004 - The Monist 87 (3):405-428.

View all 12 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Mereology.Achille C. Varzi - 2016 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Location and Mereology.Cody Gilmore - 2013 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Mereological Nihilism and Puzzles About Material Objects.Bradley Rettler - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (4):842-868.
A Tale of Two Simples.Joshua Spencer - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 148 (2):167 - 181.
Simples and Gunk.Hud Hudson - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (2):291–302.

View all 7 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Sider, Hawley, Sider and the Vagueness Argument.Nikk Effingham - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (2):241 - 250.
A Tale of Two Simples.Joshua Spencer - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 148 (2):167 - 181.
In Defence of Discrete Space and Time.Jean Paul van Bendegem - 1995 - Logique Et Analyse 38 (150-1):127-150.
Soc It to Me? Reply to McDaniel on Maxcon Simples.Ned Markosian - 2004 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (2):332 – 340.
Is the Brain Analog or Digital?Chris Eliasmith - 2000 - Cognitive Science Quarterly 1 (2):147-170.
Against Maxcon Simples.Kris McDaniel - 2003 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (2):265 – 275.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
108 ( #109,764 of 2,518,693 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
3 ( #205,898 of 2,518,693 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes