European Journal of Philosophy 22 (2):200-228 (2014)
AbstractI present an argument for an interpretation of Kant's views on the nature of the ‘content [Inhalt]’ of ‘cognition [Erkenntnis]’. In contrast to one of the longest standing interpretations of Kant's views on cognitive content, which ascribes to Kant a straightforwardly psychologistic understanding of content, and in contrast as well to the more recently influential reading of Kant put forward by McDowell and others, according to which Kant embraces a version of Russellianism, I argue that Kant's views on this topic are of a much more Fregean bent than has traditionally been admitted or appreciated. I conclude by providing a sketch of how a better grasp of Kant's views on cognitive content in general can help bring into sharper relief what is, and what is not, at stake in the recent debates over whether Kant accepts a particular kind of cognitive content—namely, non‐conceptual content.
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On the Transcendental Freedom of the Intellect.Colin McLear - 2020 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 7:35-104.
Kant on the place of cognition in the progression of our representations.Clinton Tolley - 2020 - Synthese 197 (8):3215-3244.
The Non-Conceptuality of the Content of Intuitions: A New Approach.Clinton Tolley - 2013 - Kantian Review 18 (1):107-36.
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References found in this work
Language, Truth and Logic.[author unknown] - 1937 - Erkenntnis 7 (1):123-125.
Kant, non-conceptual content and the representation of space.Lucy Allais - 2009 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 47 (3):pp. 383-413.
Having the world in view: Sellars, Kant, and intentionality.John McDowell - 1998 - Journal of Philosophy 95 (9):431-492.