Let’s pretend!: Children and joint action

Philosophy of the Social Sciences 35 (1):75-97 (2005)
Authors
Deborah Tollefsen
University of Memphis
Abstract
According to many, joint intentional action must be understood in terms of joint intentions. Most accounts of joint intention appeal to a set of sophisticated individual intentional states. The author argues that standard accounts of joint intention exclude the possibility of joint action in young children because they presuppose that the participants have a robust theory of mind, something young children lack. But young children do engage in joint action. The author offers a revision of Michael Bratman’s analysis of joint intention that reflects the socio-cognitive abilities young children do have. This revision makes sense of joint action among young children and equally well explains simple joint actions involving adults. Key Words: collective intentionality • joint action • child’s theory of mind • joint attention.
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DOI 10.1177/0048393104271925
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References found in this work BETA

Shared Intention.Michael Bratman - 1993 - Ethics 104 (1):97-113.
Collective Intentions and Actions.John Searle - 1990 - In Philip R. Cohen Jerry Morgan & Martha Pollack (eds.), Intentions in Communication. MIT Press. pp. 401-415.

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Citations of this work BETA

Prediction in Joint Action: What, When, and Where.Natalie Sebanz & Guenther Knoblich - 2009 - Topics in Cognitive Science 1 (2):353-367.
Shared Goals and Development.Olle Blomberg - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly 65 (258):94-101.
How Does It Feel to Act Together?Elisabeth Pacherie - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (1):25-46.
Common Knowledge and Reductionism About Shared Agency.Olle Blomberg - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (2):315-326.
Interacting Mindreaders.Stephen Andrew Butterfill - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (3):841-863.

View all 26 citations / Add more citations

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