The Contents of Perceptual Experience: A Kantian Perspective

De Gruyter Open (2014)
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The book addresses the debate on whether the representational content of perceptual experience is conceptual or non-conceptual, by bringing out the points of comparison between Kant s conception of intuition and contemporary accounts of non-conceptual content. It is argued that intuition provides the most basic form of intentionality pre-conceptual reference to objects, which underlies the acts of conceptualization and judgment."



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Anna Tomaszewska
Jagiellonian University

Citations of this work

Taking non‐conceptualism back to Dharmakīrti.Amit Chaturvedi - 2022 - European Journal of Philosophy 31 (1):3-29.
Kantian Conceptualism/Nonconceptualism.Colin McLear - 2020 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Wiele twarzy konceptualizmu.Piotr Kozak - 2018 - Diametros 57:88-100.

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