Philosophia 44 (1):267-274 (2016)

Toward the end of his classic treatise An Essay on Free Will, Peter van Inwagen offers a modal argument against the Principle of Sufficient Reason which he argues shows that the principle “collapses all modal distinctions.” In this paper, a critical flaw in this argument is shown to lie in van Inwagen’s beginning assumption that there is such a thing as the conjunction of all contingently true propositions. This is shown to follow from Cantor’s theorem and a property of conjunction with respect to contingent propositions. Given the failure of this assumption, van Inwagen’s argument against the Principle of Sufficient Reason cannot succeed, at least not without the addition of some remarkable and previously unacknowledged qualifications.
Keywords Principle of sufficient reason  Free will  Cantor’s theorem  Propositions  Modality
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Reprint years 2016
DOI 10.1007/s11406-016-9686-y
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References found in this work BETA

An Essay on Free Will.Peter Van Inwagen - 1983 - Oxford University Press.
There is no set of all truths.Patrick Grim - 1984 - Analysis 44 (4):206.
A New Cosmological Argument.Richard M. Gale & Alexander R. Pruss - 1999 - Religious Studies 35 (4):461-476.

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Citations of this work BETA

On Some Leibnizian Arguments for the Principle of Sufficient Reason.Stephen Harrop - 2020 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 37 (2):143-162.

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