Emergent substance

Philosophical Studies 141 (3):281 - 297 (2008)

Authors
Patrick Toner
Wake Forest University
Abstract
In this paper, I develop an ontological position according to which substances such as you and I have no substantial parts. The claim is not that we are immaterial souls. Nor is the claim that we are “human atoms” co-located with human organisms. It is, rather, that we are macrophysical objects that are, in the relevant sense, simple. I contend that despite initial appearances, this claim is not obviously false, and I defend it by showing how much work it can do.
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy of Religion   Philosophy of Mind   Epistemology   Logic   Philosophy
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-007-9160-6
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References found in this work BETA

From an Ontological Point of View.John Heil - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
Objects and Persons.Trenton Merricks - 2001 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Powers: A Study in Metaphysics.George Molnar (ed.) - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
Objects and Persons.T. Sider - 2001 - Mind 113 (449):195-198.
From an Ontological Point of View.E. J. Lowe - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (2):466-479.

View all 31 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Composition and the Cases.Andrew M. Bailey - 2016 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 59 (5):453-470.
Hylemorphic Animalism.Patrick Toner - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 155 (1):65 - 81.
Towards a Hylomorphic Solution to the Grounding Problem.Kathrin Koslicki - 2018 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements to Philosophy 82:333-364.
Neo-Aristotelian Plenitude.Ross Inman - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 168 (3):583-597.

View all 23 citations / Add more citations

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