Functional concepts, referentially opaque contexts, causal relations, and the definition of theoretical terms

Philosophical Studies 105 (3):251-79 (2001)
Abstract
In his recent article, ``Self-Consciousness', George Bealer has set outa novel and interesting argument against functionalism in the philosophyof mind. I shall attempt to show, however, that Bealer's argument cannotbe sustained.In arguing for this conclusion, I shall be defending three main theses.The first is connected with the problem of defining theoreticalpredicates that occur in theories where the following two features arepresent: first, the theoretical predicate in question occurswithin both extensional and non-extensional contexts; secondly, thetheory in question asserts that the relevant theoretical states enterinto causal relations. What I shall argue is that a Ramsey-styleapproach to the definition of such theoretical terms requires twodistinct quantifiers: one which ranges over concepts, and theother which ranges over properties in the world.
Keywords Cause  Concept  Context  Functionalism  Metaphysics  Mind  Self-consciousness  Theoretical Term  Bealer, G
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DOI 10.1023/A:1010381127525
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