Coin flips, credences and the Reflection Principle

Analysis 72 (3):478-488 (2012)
Abstract
One recent topic of debate in Bayesian epistemology has been the question of whether imprecise credences can be rational. I argue that one account of imprecise credences, the orthodox treatment as defended by James M. Joyce, is untenable. Despite Joyce’s claims to the contrary, a puzzle introduced by Roger White shows that the orthodox account, when paired with Bas C. van Fraassen’s Reflection Principle, can lead to inconsistent beliefs. Proponents of imprecise credences, then, must either provide a compelling reason to reject Reflection or admit that the rational credences in White’s case are precise.
Keywords precise  imprecise  sharp  mushy  subjective probability  Bayesian epistemology
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DOI 10.1093/analys/ans077
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References found in this work BETA
Humean Supervenience Debugged.David Lewis - 1994 - Mind 103 (412):473--490.
Distorted Reflection.Rachael Briggs - 2009 - Philosophical Review 118 (1):59-85.
Correcting the Guide to Objective Chance.Ned Hall - 1994 - Mind 103 (412):505-518.

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