Analysis 72 (3):478-488 (2012)

Authors
Brett Topey
University of Salzburg
Abstract
One recent topic of debate in Bayesian epistemology has been the question of whether imprecise credences can be rational. I argue that one account of imprecise credences, the orthodox treatment as defended by James M. Joyce, is untenable. Despite Joyce’s claims to the contrary, a puzzle introduced by Roger White shows that the orthodox account, when paired with Bas C. van Fraassen’s Reflection Principle, can lead to inconsistent beliefs. Proponents of imprecise credences, then, must either provide a compelling reason to reject Reflection or admit that the rational credences in White’s case are precise.
Keywords precise  imprecise  sharp  mushy  subjective probability  Bayesian epistemology
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DOI 10.1093/analys/ans077
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References found in this work BETA

Reflection and Disagreement.Adam Elga - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):478–502.
Humean Supervenience Debugged.David K. Lewis - 1994 - Mind 103 (412):473--490.
Belief and the Will.Bas C. van Fraassen - 2010 - In Antony Eagle (ed.), Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings. Routledge. pp. 235-256.
A Subjectivist’s Guide to Objective Chance.David K. Lewis - 1980 - In Richard C. Jeffrey (ed.), Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability, Volume II. Berkeley: University of California Press. pp. 263-293.

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Citations of this work BETA

Imprecise Probabilities.Seamus Bradley - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Updating as Communication.Sarah Moss - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):225-248.
Subjunctive Credences and Semantic Humility.Sarah Moss - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (2):251-278.
An Argument for the Principle of Indifference and Against the Wide Interval View.John E. Wilcox - 2020 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 51 (1):65-87.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

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