Accessibility, implicit bias, and epistemic justification

Synthese:1-19 (forthcoming)
Abstract
It has recently been argued that beliefs formed on the basis of implicit biases pose a challenge for accessibilism, since implicit biases are consciously inaccessible, yet they seem to be relevant to epistemic justification. Recent empirical evidence suggests, however, that while we may typically lack conscious access to the source of implicit attitudes and their impact on our beliefs and behaviour, we do have access to their content. In this paper, I discuss the notion of accessibility required for this argument to work vis-à-vis these empirical results and offer two ways in which the accessibilist could meet the challenge posed by implicit biases. Ultimately both strategies fail, but the way in which they do, I conclude, reveals something general and important about our epistemic obligations and about the intuitions that inform the role of implicit biases in accessibilist justification.
Keywords accessibilism  epistemic justification  implicit biases
Categories No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11229-018-1795-7
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Alief and Belief.Tamar Szabó Gendler - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (10):634-663.
Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.
Alief in Action (and Reaction).Tamar Szabó Gendler - 2008 - Mind and Language 23 (5):552--585.

View all 30 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

The Evil Demon Inside.Nicholas Silins - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Accessibilism and the Challenge From Implicit Bias.Katherine Puddifoot - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (3).
Implicit Bias, Moods, and Moral Responsibility.Alex Madva - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (S1):53-78.
Two Flaws Concerning Belief Accounts of Implicit Biases.Baston Rene - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (3):352-367.
Responsibility for Implicit Bias.Jules Holroyd - 2012 - Journal of Social Philosophy 43 (3):274-306.
Implicit Racial Bias and Epistemic Pessimism.Charles Lassiter & Nathan Ballantyne - 2017 - Philosophical Psychology 30 (1-2):79-101.
Collective Implicit Attitudes: A Stakeholder Conception of Implicit Bias.Carole J. Lee - 2018 - Proceedings of the 40th Annual Cognitive Science Society.
The Heterogeneity of Implicit Bias.Jules Holroyd & Joseph Sweetman - forthcoming - In Michael Brownstein & Jennifer Saul (eds.), Implicit Bias and Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
VIII- What Do We Want From a Model of Implicit Cognition?Jules Holroyd - 2016 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 116 (2):153-179.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2018-05-05

Total views
37 ( #179,245 of 2,309,277 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
18 ( #28,483 of 2,309,277 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature