Free belief


Authors
Josefa Toribio
Universitat de Barcelona
Abstract
The main goal of this paper is to show that Pettit and Smith’s (1996) argument concerning the nature of free belief is importantly incomplete. I accept Pettit and Smith’s emphasis upon normative constraints governing responsible believing and desiring, and their claim that the responsibly believing agent needs to possess an ability to believe (or desire) otherwise when believing (desiring) wrongly. But I argue that their characterization of these constraints does not do justice to one crucial factor, namely, the presence of an unreflective, sub-personally constituted, ability to spot the kind of situations in which the reflective critical abilities constitutive of responsible believing (and desiring) should be deployed
Keywords Belief  Ethics  Evidence  Recognition  Responsibility
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2004, 2006
DOI 10.1023/B:PHEN.0000007369.76709.4e
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 38,928
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

What We Do When We Judge.Josefa Toribio - 2011 - Dialectica 65 (3):345-367.
Belief and Freedom of Mind.Christopher Hookway - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (2):195 – 204.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Animal Belief.Roger Fellows - 2000 - Philosophy 75 (294):587-599.
'In Between Believing' and Degrees of Belief.Darrell P. Rowbottom - 2007 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 26 (1):131-137.
The Ethics of Belief.Andrew Chignell - 2016 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Why Believe?John Cottingham - 2009 - Continuum.
Direct and Indirect Belief.Curtis Brown - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (2):289-316.
Getting Told and Being Believed.Richard A. Moran - 2005 - Philosophers' Imprint 5:1-29.
Why Responsible Belief is Blameless Belief.Anthony Robert Booth & Rik Peels - 2010 - Journal of Philosophy 107 (5):257-265.
Free Will Skepticism and Personhood as a Desert Base.Benjamin Vilhauer - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (3):pp. 489-511.
Evidentialism and Pragmatic Constraints on Outright Belief.Dorit Ganson - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (3):441 - 458.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
95 ( #74,087 of 2,319,325 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #786,356 of 2,319,325 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature