AbstractThere are different ways in which imaginings can involve the first-person. I can imagine skiing down a mountain, looking down the slope, the wind whipping me in the face. I can also imagine myself skiing down a mountain from the outside, adopting the point of view of a spectator watching myself fly down the mountain. I can also imagine that I am someone else entirely, say Angela Merkel, skiing down a mountain. In this paper I develop and defend a new account of the content of first-person imaginings. I first look at two existing accounts, one proposed by Francois Recanati (2007a, 2007b) and the other proposed by Dilip Ninan (2008), and I argue that they lack the resources to model the rich and distinct types of first-person imaginings that we can have. I then present and defend a new account that reconstrues the imagining from the inside vs. imagining from the outside distinction and can accommodate the various ways in which imaginings involve the first-person.
Similar books and articles
Belief-Like Imagining and Correctness.Alon Chasid - 2021 - American Philosophical Quarterly 58 (2):147-160.
Is imagination too liberal for modal epistemology?Derek Lam - 2018 - Synthese 195 (5):2155-2174.
The evaluative character of imaginative resistance.Dustin R. Stokes - 2006 - British Journal of Aesthetics 46 (4):287-405.
On Choosing What to Imagine.Peter Langland-Hassan - 2016 - In A. Kind & P. Kung (eds.), Knowledge Through Imagination. Oxford University Press. pp. 61-84.
Ethics and Fictive Imagining.Brandon Cooke - 2014 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 72 (3):317-327.
The Meanings of “Imagine” Part II: Attitude and Action.Neil Van Leeuwen - 2014 - Philosophy Compass 9 (11):791-802.
Imagining in response to fiction: unpacking the infrastructure.Alon Chasid - 2019 - Philosophical Explorations 23 (1):31-48.
Imagery, the imagination and experience.Dominic Gregory - 2010 - Philosophical Quarterly 60 (241):735-753.
Muscular Imaginings—A Phenomenological and Enactive Model for Imagination.Jesús Ilundáin - 2017 - Sport, Ethics and Philosophy 11 (1):92-108.
The first-person perspective.Sydney Shoemaker - 1994 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 68 (2):7-22.
Muscular Imaginings—A Phenomenological and Enactive Model for Imagination.Jesús Ilundáin-Agurruza - 2017 - Sport, Ethics and Philosophy 11 (1):92-108.
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads