How do we know how?

Philosophical Explorations 11 (1):39 – 52 (2008)
I raise some doubts about the plausibility of Stanley and Williamson's view that all knowledge-how is just a species of propositional knowledge. By tackling the question of what is involved in entertaining a proposition, I try to show that Stanley and Williamson's position leads to an uncomfortable dilemma. Depending on how we understand the notion of contemplating a proposition, either intuitively central cases of knowing-how cannot be thus classified or we lose our grip on the very idea of propositional knowledge, which then fails to demarcate any clear class of cases. I conclude with a brief discussion of the nature and role of knowledge-how, and its relation to the important, but less explored, notion of expertise.
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DOI 10.1080/13869790701599044
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The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - Hutchinson & Co.

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On Stanley's Intellectualism.J. Adam Carter - 2012 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20 (5):749-762.
Know-How as Competence. A Rylean Responsibilist Account.David Löwenstein - 2017 - Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann.

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