Philosophical Explorations 11 (1):39 – 52 (2008)
I raise some doubts about the plausibility of Stanley and Williamson's view that all knowledge-how is just a species of propositional knowledge. By tackling the question of what is involved in entertaining a proposition, I try to show that Stanley and Williamson's position leads to an uncomfortable dilemma. Depending on how we understand the notion of contemplating a proposition, either intuitively central cases of knowing-how cannot be thus classified or we lose our grip on the very idea of propositional knowledge, which then fails to demarcate any clear class of cases. I conclude with a brief discussion of the nature and role of knowledge-how, and its relation to the important, but less explored, notion of expertise.
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References found in this work BETA
Sight Unseen: An Exploration of Conscious and Unconscious Vision.Melvyn A. Goodale & A. David Milner - 2004 - Oxford University Press.
The Intensions of Intentionality and Other New Models for Modalities.Jaakko Hintikka - 1975 - Dordrecht: D. Reidel.
Citations of this work BETA
Doing Without Believing: Intellectualism, Knowledge-How, and Belief-Attribution.Michael Brownstein & Eliot Michaelson - 2016 - Synthese 193 (9):2815–2836.
On Stanley's Intellectualism.J. Adam Carter - 2012 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20 (5):749-762.
Know-How as Competence. A Rylean Responsibilist Account.David Löwenstein - 2017 - Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann.
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