At the start of NE IX.8 Aristotle says that the virtuous man acts for his friend’s sake and neglect his own interests , but only a few paragraphs later says that the virtuous self-lover will also sacrifice money, honors, and even his life, for the sake of his friend, all while he obtains what is most noble—virtuous acts . This leads us to the question: Is this really a sacrifice if the virtuous self-lover is profiting in some way? Is it possible for the virtuous friend to sacrifice her life for her friend’s sake while knowing he is ‘procuring the most noble good’ for himself at the same time? Or more generally, can the virtuous self-loving friend do things for his friend without his own interests in mind? Aristotle’s conception of self-love either a) prohibits the virtuous man for acting for his friends sake , b) does not prohibit the virtuous man from acting for his friend’s sake, or c) enables him to act for his friends sake. I will discuss the following claims in Section III, where I will consider Julia Annas and Richard Krauts’ discussion on the matter
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 69,160
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Aristotle on Other-Selfhood and Reciprocal Shaping.Anthony Carreras - 2012 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 29 (4):319-336.
Eudaimonia, External Results, and Choosing Virtuous Actions for Themselves.Jennifer Whiting - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2):270-290.
The Motivational State of the Virtuous Agent.Lorraine Besser-Jones - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 25 (1):93 - 108.
Virtuous Peers in Work Organizations.Dennis Moberg - 1997 - Business Ethics Quarterly 7 (1):67-85.
Wisdom and Action Guidance in the Agent-Based Virtue Ethics of Aristotle.S. Thomas Sherman - 2006 - American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 80 (4):481-506.
Right Act, Virtuous Motive.Thomas Hurka - 2010 - In Heather D. Battaly (ed.), Virtue and Vice, Moral and Epistemic. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 58-72.


Added to PP index

Total views
14 ( #729,045 of 2,499,275 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #418,195 of 2,499,275 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes