Partly deductive support in the Popper-Miller argument

Philosophy of Science 56 (3):490-496 (1989)
Abstract
Popper and Miller (1983) have presented an argument purporting to establish the impossibility of inductive probability. Here I discuss critically their characterization of a deductive part of nondeductive support, a point that has not figured centrally in previous responses.
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DOI 10.1086/289504
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