The Individuation of Causal Powers by Events (and Consequences of the Approach)

Metaphysica 11 (1):49-61 (2010)
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Abstract

In this paper, I explore the notion of a “causal power”, particularly as it is relevant to a theory of properties whereby properties are individuated by the causal powers they bestow on the objects that instantiate them. I take as my target certain eliminativist positions that argue that certain kinds of properties (or relations) do not exist because they fail to bestow unique causal powers on objects. But the notion of a causal powers is inextricably bound up with our notion of what an event is, and not only is there disagreement as to which theory of events is appropriate, but on the three prevailing theories, it can be shown that the eliminativists arguments do not follow.

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Brandon N. Towl
Washington University in St. Louis

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References found in this work

A World of States of Affairs.D. M. Armstrong - 1997 - Cambridge University Press.
What is a Law of Nature?D. M. Armstrong - 1983 - Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.
From an Ontological Point of View.John Heil - 2003 - Oxford University Press.

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