Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates

Oxford, England: Oxford University Press (2012)
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Abstract

The relative merits and demerits of historically prominent views such as the correspondence theory, coherentism, pragmatism, verificationism, and instrumentalism have been subject to much attention in the truth literature and have fueled the long-lived debate over which of these views is the most plausible one. While diverging in their specific philosophical commitments, adherents of these historically prominent views agree in at least one fundamental respect. They are all alethic monists. They all endorse the thesis that there is only one property in virtue of which propositions can be true, and so, in this sense, take truth to be one. The truth pluralist, on the other hand, rejects this idea. There are several properties in virtue of which propositions can be true. The literature on truth pluralism has been growing steadily for the past twenty years. This volume, however, is the first of its kind—the first collection of papers focused specifically on pluralism about truth. Part I is dedicated to the development, investigation, and critical discussion of different forms of pluralism. An additional reason to look at truth pluralism with interest is the significant connections it bears to other debates in the truth literature—the debates concerning traditional theories of truth and the deflationism/inflationism divide being cases in hand. Parts II and III of the volume connect truth pluralism to these two debates.

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Author Profiles

Cory Wright
California State University, Long Beach

Citations of this work

Making sense of logical pluralism.Matti Eklund - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63 (3-4):433-454.
Ecumenical alethic pluralism.Filippo Ferrari & Sebastiano Moruzzi - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (3):368-393.
The correspondence theory of truth.Marian David - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
What is deflationism about truth?Matti Eklund - 2017 - Synthese 198 (2):631-645.
From one to many: recent work on truth.Jeremy Wyatt & Michael Lynch - 2016 - American Philosophical Quarterly 53 (4):323-340.

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