Anti-realistic Notions of Truth

Topoi 31 (1):5-8 (2012)
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Abstract

Validity, the central concept of the so-called ‘proof-theoretic semantics’ is described as correctly applying to the arguments that denote proofs. In terms of validity, I propose an anti-realist characterization of the notions of truth and correct assertion, at the core of which is the idea that valid arguments may fail to be recognized as such. The proposed account is compared with Dummett’s and Prawitz’s views on the matter.

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2012-03-16

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Luca Tranchini
Universität Tübingen

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Proof-Theoretic Semantics.Peter Schroeder-Heister - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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