Sophia 43 (2):87-93 (2004)
In this paper I further the discussion on the adequacy of free will theodicies initiated by Joel Tierno. Tierno’s principal claim is that free will theodicies fail to account for the wide distribution of moral evil. I attempt to show that, even if Tierno need not rely on a compatibilist conception of free will in order to substantiate the aforementioned claim, there remains good reason to think that free will theodicies are not explanatorily inadequate in the way suggested by Tierno.
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Theodicy: The Solution to the Problem of Evil, or Part of the Problem?Nick Trakakis - 2008 - Sophia 47 (2):161-191.
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