The silence of the senses

Mind 113 (449):57-94 (2004)
Abstract
There is a view abroad on which perceptual experience has representational content in this sense: in it something is represented to the perceiver as so. On the view, a perceptual experience has a face value at which it may be taken, or which may be rejected. This paper argues that that view is mistaken: there is nothing in perceptual experience which makes it so that in it anything is represented as so. In that sense, the senses are silent, or, in Austin's term, dumb. Perceptual experience is not as such either veridical or delusive. It may mislead, but it does not take representation to accomplish that
Keywords Content  Experience  Metaphysics  Perception  Representation  Harman, G  Mcdowell, J
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DOI 10.1093/mind/113.449.57
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On Seeing That Someone is Angry.William E. S. McNeill - 2012 - European Journal of Philosophy 20 (4):575-597.
Perceptual Particularity.Susanna Schellenberg - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (1):25-54.

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