Doing without Events

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 8 (1):173 - 185 (1978)
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Events have played a central role in a number of recent philosophical analyses. In general, there are two different sorts of arguments that might be offered in favour of an event analysis: first, it might be held that the constructions being analyzed contain certain nominals which intuitively refer to events, and further that any satisfactory analysis must respect these intuitions; second, it might be argued that quite aside from our intuitions, the concept of an event — perhaps as a purely technical device — permits the solution of philosophical problems implicit in alternative non-event analyses.I wish to argue that both the above sorts of arguments fail. First, I argue that our intuitions about the reference on nominals are inconsistent, varying from context to context, so that the various sorts of event analyses cannot be talking about a single category of entities.



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Russell Trenholme
Princeton University (PhD)

Citations of this work

Functionalism and Token Physicalism.Terence Horgan - 1984 - Synthese 59 (June):321-38.
Two Approaches to Event Ontology.Eugen Zeleňák - 2009 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 16 (3):283-303.

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References found in this work

Linguistics in Philosophy.Zeno Vendler - 2019 - Cornell University Press.
Causal Relations.Donald Davidson - 1967 - Journal of Philosophy 64 (21):691-703.
Causation, Nomic Subsumption, and the Concept of Event.Jaegwon Kim - 1973 - Journal of Philosophy 70 (8):217-236.

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