Question authority: in defense of moral naturalism without clout

Philosophical Studies 150 (2):221 - 238 (2010)
Abstract
Metaethicists of all stripes should read and learn from Richard Joyce's book The Evolution of Morality. This includes moral realists, despite Joyce's own nihilism. Joyce thinks that moral obligations, prohibitions, and the like are myths. But that is just a bit of a rich, broad account of moral attitudes and practices, the bulk of which can comfortably be accepted by realists. In fact, other than nihilism itself, there's only one claim of Joyce's which realists must reject. I argue that that claim ought to be rejected, and reply to Joyce's argument to the contrary. The result is that—aside from nihilism and one rejectable claim—realists are free to take from Joyce whatever they like
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy of Language   Metaphysics   Ethics   Philosophy of Mind   Epistemology   Philosophy
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-009-9382-x
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References found in this work BETA
The Myth of Morality.Richard Joyce - 2001 - Cambridge University Press.
Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives.Philippa Foot - 1972 - Philosophical Review 81 (3):305-316.
Realist-Expressivism: A Neglected Option for Moral Realism.David Copp - 2001 - Social Philosophy and Policy 18 (2):1-43.
The Challenge of Communal Internalism.Jon Tresan - 2009 - Journal of Value Inquiry 43 (2):179-199.

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Citations of this work BETA
Morality, Inescapable Rational Authority, and a God's Wishes.Gerald K. Harrison - 2015 - Journal of Religious Ethics 43 (3):454-474.

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