Theoria 79 (4):353-377 (2013)

Paolo Tripodi
Università degli Studi di Torino
According to McDowell, in Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind the myth of Jones has the purpose of completing the account of experience that Sellars needs to argue against traditional empiricism. In particular, on McDowell's view the myth of Jones should explain how to conceive of non-inferentially knowable experiences as containing propositional claims. This article argues that the myth of Jones does not succeed in providing such an account, especially on McDowell's own terms: assuming McDowell's epistemological distinction between inferential and non-inferential knowledge, it turns out that in Sellars' thought experiment perceptual experiences can contain propositional claims only at the price of being known inferentially rather than non-inferentially. Therefore McDowell's Sellars' attack fails against traditional empiricism
Keywords non‐inferential knowledge  McDowell  Brandom  Sellars  myth of Jones  traditional empiricism
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/theo.12000
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 60,750
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - Hutchinson & Co.
Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind.Wilfrid S. Sellars - 1956 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1:253-329.
Verbal Behavior.B. F. Skinner - 1957 - Appleton-Century-Crofts.

View all 27 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles


Added to PP index

Total views
127 ( #81,114 of 2,438,720 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #436,491 of 2,438,720 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes