Husserl and the Mind–Body Problem

New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy 11:1-15 (2011)
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The aim of this article is to situate positively Husserl’s philosophy with respect to current discussions concerning the mind–body problem and, more specifically,the so-called “hard problem” of consciousness. It will be first argued that the view according to which phenomenology can contribute to the solution of the hard problem by being naturalized and incorporated into cognitive sciences is based on a misunderstanding of the nature and aim of Husserl’s philosophy.Subsequently, it will be shown that phenomenology deals with the issue of the relation between mind and body in the framework of the transcendental foundationof the ontology of animal nature, and provides thereby a non-reductionist solution to the hard problem. This discussion will at the same time stress the sharp differences existing between phenomenology and philosophy of mind, and highlight the relation between phenomenology and ontology.



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Emiliano Trizio
University of the West of England

References found in this work

What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.
What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 2004 - In Tim Crane & Katalin Farkas (eds.), Metaphysics: a guide and anthology. Oxford University Press UK.
The hard problem of consciousness.David Chalmers - 2007 - In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Chichester, UK: Blackwell. pp. 32–42.

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